training of officers of the tsarist army (myths and reality). Nikita Barinov. training of officers of the tsarist army (myths and reality) Fantasies and reality

Recently, a version has become popular that the defeats in Belarus in the summer of 1941 were allegedly the result of the fact that the commander of the Western Special Military District (ZapOVO), Army General Pavlov, did not bring the troops into combat readiness.

Some authors classified as “pop historians - Stalinists”, such as Yu. Mukhin, O. Kozinkin and A. Martirosyan, claim that the archives contain documents, the contents of which indicate that Pavlov promptly received an order to bring in troops subordinate to him districts are on alert. And that it was Pavlov’s failure to comply with these orders from the high command that led to the disaster in the ZapOVO, while in other districts where the order was carried out, there were no such terrible defeats. Let's consider their arguments:

O. Kozinkin writes - “ Pavlov nevertheless received the directive to increase combat readiness on June 12–13, to put “cover plans” into action, also on time. And Pavlov confirmed this in court“At the same time, he also claims that there was another document dated June 18 with similar orders. At the same time, it is completely unclear why it was necessary to repeat the orders and, moreover, why it was necessary to draw up Directive No. 1 so that it requires the implementation of the measures necessary to bring the troops into combat readiness (take positions). But let's figure out what was in that very directive of June 13. This refers to the following document:

1. To increase the combat readiness of the troops in the districts, all deep rifle divisions and commands of the infantry corps with corps units should be brought to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan (NCO Directive No. 503859/ss/ov).

2. Leave the border divisions in place, having their withdrawal to the border in their assigned areas, if necessary, this will be done by my special order.

3. 44th corps, as part of the corps control 108, 64, 161 and 143rd divisions and corps units - withdraw to the Baranovichi region, at your discretion.

Move the 37th infantry division to the Lida area, incorporating it into the 21st infantry corps.

5. Submit a withdrawal plan indicating the order and timing of withdrawal for each connection by courier by [June 41]

Let's consider the very concept of “combat readiness”. According to the dictionary of military terms, this is " a state that ensures the ability of troops (forces) in any situation to begin military operations on time and successfully complete assigned tasks. The combat effectiveness of troops (forces) is determined by timely preparation for upcoming actions" It is easy to see that there is not a single word about “bringing the ZAPOVO troops to combat readiness” in the “Directive of June 13.” To achieve full combat readiness, it is absolutely not enough to simply move troops. It is also necessary to raise mobilization reserves, distribute ammunition to troops, raise stored equipment, and so on. There is nothing of this in the order.

Subsequently, Kozinkin argued that the hint of “bringing to combat readiness” turns out to be contained in the requirement to increase combat readiness. However, it is obvious that the term “bringing to combat readiness” has a very definite meaning and is in no way identical to the requirement to increase combat readiness, which is not defined in any way in the Charter. Moreover, the document directly states what needs to be done: move the “deep” rifle divisions and... leave the border troops in place. This, by the way, contradicts the assertion that Pavlov was obliged to withdraw troops from Brest in mid-June.

Even more interesting is the situation with the implementation of cover plans. As is well known, the implementation of these plans was carried out upon receipt of a signal. In reality, this is what happened. Why send a whole telegram to introduce them? Moreover, the document only talks about the movement of troops to the areas assigned to them according to the cover plan, and not all of them, but only rifle divisions and only deep ones. This instruction did not apply to the rest. Thus, it is impossible to say that the Directive of July 13 put into effect cover plans. So, perhaps, execution had not begun by June 22? And this is not true. As is well known, for example, the same 21st sk found the beginning of the war on the march.

So, there is simply nothing to present to Pavlov under this directive. What does it say about the document of June 18? The main argument is a reference to the interrogation protocols of General Pavlov:

« Leaving Minsk, the commander of the communications regiment reported to me that the chemical warfare department did not allow him to take combat gas masks from the NZ. The artillery department of the district did not allow him to take cartridges from the NZ, and the regiment only has a guard norm of 15 pieces of cartridges per soldier, and the supply department did not allow him to take field kitchens from the NZ. Thus, even on the day of June 18, the contented departments of the headquarters were not oriented that war was close... And after the telegram from the Chief of the General Staff of June 18, the district troops were not put on combat readiness.

Defendant. All this is true."

However, it does not say in any way that the document dated June 18 contained a direct instruction to do anything. After all, “after” does not mean “as a result.” But why didn’t Pavlov point out that he was not obliged to bring the troops into combat readiness? But Pavlov “confessed” to no less absurd things. Eg " After the Spanish events, my relationship with Meretskov continued to be the best until the last days, Meretskov still exerted great influence on me, and I carried out all his instructions on the military line (he was then the chief of the General Staff and the chief of combat training) without delving into them essence. As subsequent events showed, these instructions from Meretskov were sabotage, since they amounted to delaying the timing of combat training in the district entrusted to me, which was currently unacceptable... In this regard, Meretskov suggested that I not place special emphasis on accelerating combat training in the district, but conduct everything according to the annual plan.“Taking into account Pavlov’s words about “forced testimony” given during the investigation, which he later abandoned at trial, it is difficult to perceive the confessions as a completely objective source.

O. Kozinkin also claims that the existence of certain directives from the General Staff to put them on combat readiness is confirmed by General Abramidze, who gave answers during a survey in the early 50s. " On June 20, 1941, I received the following encrypted message from the General Staff: “All units and units of your formation located on the very border must be withdrawn back several kilometers, that is, to the line of prepared positions... All units of the division must be put on combat readiness. Execution to be delivered by 24 hours on June 21, 1941"But it's not clear. Why is the date June 20? It would seem that the document dated June 18 should be brought to the attention of the division commander earlier. The author wants to attribute all these oddities to sabotage, but the evidence itself raises many questions. Firstly, the other commanders interviewed knew nothing about such encryption. For example, General Smehotvorov, who was the commander of the 135th Infantry Division of the same district in 1941, testifies: “ There were no orders to put units of the formation on combat readiness before the start of hostilities" The former chief of staff of the border 62nd rifle division states: “ On June 19, the unit commanders conducted a reconnaissance of the defense areas, but all this was done with uncertainty; it was not thought that war would break out soon. We did not believe that we were going to fight, and we took everything unnecessary for the battle. As a result, they overloaded their automobile and horse transport with excess property)»

There are other questions. For example, is Abramidze confusing the dates? The 72nd State Duma occupied a fairly calm area, as Isaev points out, there were no hostilities there. At the same time, its actions absolutely exactly repeat the subsequent Directive No. 1. If a certain directive was given already on June 20 (or even on the 18th), then what is the point of giving a similar one on June 21? What if in fact he received the document on the night of June 22? Then everything falls into place. Moreover, it is impossible to attribute this document to June 18th. In the Baltic Special Military District (PribOVO) on June 18, they continued to prepare for July 1. Finally, even from the supposed existence of a document on the Kyiv Special Military District (KOVO) it does not in any way follow that there is a similar one for ZapOVO. There is evidence according to which the Odessa Special Military District was also not put on combat readiness until June 22, 1941. There are no references to such orders in PribOVO documents either.

The following thesis is even more puzzling: “ However, what they managed to publish turned out to be quite enough to drive a good, very good aspen stake into the utterly false stories of Khrushchev, Zhukov and other liars like them that on the eve of the war, Stalin did not allow the troops to be put on combat readiness. Because all those whose answers were given in the first publications operated with dates in the range from 13–14 to 24.00 on June 21. Moreover, some of them directly indicated that they received orders to put troops on combat readiness personally from Zhukov, including both verbally and in writing. Only in Western district, commanded by a traitor, but the “innocent victim of Stalinism” the order to bring the troops to combat readiness was not given.“We have already seen that the author, to put it mildly, got excited about “only in the Western District.” But maybe at least in the Baltic district there were someone besides Abramidze who “p received orders to put troops on combat readiness personally from Zhukov"? After the above text, Kozinkin quotes at length the statements of Poluboyarov and Fadeev, who served in the Baltic Military District (PribOVO). An unprepared reader may get the impression that they increased the combat readiness of the units subordinate to them in accordance with some instructions from Zhukov, who, it’s true. For some reason it is not mentioned. But Kozinkin ignores the message of General Sobennikov, commander of 8 A.:

« F.I. Kuznetsov called me aside and excitedly informed me that some German mechanized units were concentrated in Suwalki. He ordered me to immediately withdraw the formations to the border, and by the morning of June 19 to place the army headquarters at a command post 12 km southwest of Siauliai.

The commander of the district troops decided to go to Taurage and put Major General M.S. Shumilov’s 11th Rifle Corps there on combat readiness...By the end of the day, verbal orders were given to concentrate troops on the border. On the morning of June 19, I personally checked the progress of the order... It should be noted that no one received any written orders to deploy formations. Everything was carried out on the basis of an oral order from the commander of the district troops. Subsequently, contradictory instructions began to be received by telephone and telegraph about the construction of detectors, mining, and so on. It was difficult to understand them. They were cancelled, reconfirmed and cancelled. On the night of June 22, I personally received an order from the district chief of staff, Lieutenant General P.S. Klenov, to withdraw troops from the border. In general, there was great nervousness everywhere, a fear of “provoking a war” and, as a result, inconsistency in actions arose. “From this narrative it follows that Kuznetsov carried out activities not in accordance with clear orders from above, but on his own initiative, since he justified the actions of the concentration of enemy troops, and not on orders from above. The lack of clear instructions also speaks to the “amateur activity” of the district headquarters.

Fantasy and reality.

Thus, on this moment there is no evidence of any orders from the General Staff or NPOs to put troops on combat readiness before June 21. But was this the deciding factor?

You can conduct a thought experiment and try to answer the question - “would the troops commanded by Pavlov have been able to stop the Germans already during the border battle or at least seriously delay the development of their offensive if they had been brought to combat readiness in a timely manner?” This does not require strategy games on cards, computers or sandboxes. We have a ready-made model - the battles of the Baltic Special Military District. Moreover, Korzinkin, Mukhin and Martirosyan cite this particular district as an “exemplary” district, claiming that it was there that the troops were put on alert. What happened in the Baltic states after the start of the war? Let's look at the map:

It is easy to see that in the very first days the front began to fall apart, just as it happened in all other border districts. The Germans were stopped, albeit briefly, only on the Western Dvina line. The documents paint a grim picture:

« To the commander of the troops of the [Northwestern] Front, Colonel General Kuznetsov...The army is in a helpless position - it has no connection with us or with the mechanized corps. [Head of the Armored Directorate of the North-Western Front] Colonel Poluboyarov»

June 23: " 48th Infantry Division - there is no information about two battalions of the 328th Infantry Regiment. Individual people and convoys are delayed Kolnun, Rossieny... The 301st Infantry Regiment is supposedly withdrawing to the Reistray area south of the station. Erzhvilki... Throughout the entire day of hostilities, enemy aviation kept all units of the 11th Rifle Corps under strong influence. From the withdrawn units of the border detachment, detachments were organized to detain those leaving the front without permission;... The 202nd motorized division from the Kelme area is ready to attack on Skaudville. Due to lack of communication, there is no data on the actions of the corps units since the morning of June 23... No operational report was received from the headquarters of the 11th Army. Communication with the front headquarters is broken...5. A summary of the situation and actions of the air force - additionally. Communication with the air divisions has been disrupted.» « The 125th Infantry Division, having suffered heavy losses, withdrew the remnants of its forces to Nemakshchay. The regiment commander, two deputy regiment commanders, and two battalion commanders were killed. Personnel losses – 40%. The enemy introduced at least one tank division into the gap that formed between the 90th and 125th rifle divisions and is advancing in the direction of Siauliai. ... The 12th mechanized corps and the 2nd tank division (3rd mechanized corps) from 11 hours 45 minutes before 12 o'clock they were supposed to launch a counterattack: ... the 12th mechanized corps practically went on the offensive late, only at 13–15 o'clock. During the march, he was attacked 4 times by enemy aircraft. The march was slow, and only at 18:00 the 28th Panzer Division deployed to attack the tanks, but the enemy tanks retreated to Scoutville after an unsuccessful attack.

The 2nd Panzer Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps from Rossiena was to attack at Skaudville. Due to the lack of communication with the mechanized corps, data on the result of the attack is unknown...

The 5th Infantry Division retreats in very difficult conditions to Kaunas, fighting with the enemy surrounding it.

The 126th Infantry Division retreated to the right bank of the river. Neman. There is no information about the 126th Infantry Division.

Throughout the day, the 11th Army was without wire communications and did not respond by radio. No reports were received from the army. There is no information about losses or trophies. » A day later, at 10 o’clock on June 24:

« During the night, communications were gradually disrupted by saboteurs and bombs. By 6 o'clock the wire connection was maintained with Moscow and the 8th Army, but in all other directions it was interrupted.

The radio operates intermittently due to enemy interference; Enemy aircraft continue to bombard airfields, bridges and large populated areas...

The losses are significant and are being confirmed.

46 guns were lost.

...The 48th Infantry Division fought in the Rossiena area during 22–23.6.41 and by the morning of 24.6.41 it retreated to the front of Lidovyany and Eiragol. The losses are very large, to be determined. ...

The 12th Mechanized Corps launched a counterattack at 7:45 a.m.: the 23rd Tank Division - in the direction of Laukuva, Upinas; The 28th Panzer Division, in cooperation with the 23rd Panzer Division, destroys with tanks the cavalry and infantry of the enemy advancing north of Skaudville. There is no data yet on the results of the corps' counterattack. ...

33rd Infantry Division - along the river. Viliya to Padagyai. 188th Infantry Division, which suffered heavy losses - Art. Padagyai to Perelazai.

It was not possible to obtain information from the 126th and 128th Infantry, 2nd and 5th Tank and 84th Motorized Divisions.

Departure from the river The Neman flows in great disorder.

Due to lack of communication, detailed data on the position of the 11th Army units is not available.

29th Rifle Corps: The 184th Rifle Division had the task of reaching the Olkeniki area to organize defense here. 179th Infantry Division - in the area of ​​the Sventsyansk camp. There is no information about the 29th [th Rifle Corps]. »

Such long quotes, I hope, convinced the reader that bringing the PribVo troops into combat readiness did not save them from severe defeat. According to Kolomiets, the troops of 11A of the North-Western Front had lost 75% of their equipment and 60% of their personnel by June 24, and by July 10, the front troops had 10-30% of their original strength, despite the entry into battle of troops stationed far from the border. Moreover, if you look closely at the map, it becomes clear that the defeat in the Baltic states was partly a consequence of the defeat of the Western Front.

Indeed, General Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group, having defeated the NWF forces on the border, quickly turned south and reached Minsk, where it linked up with General Guderian’s 2nd TGr. This made it possible to close the boiler west of the capital of Belarus. Thus, even putting troops on combat readiness a few days before June 22 was not a guarantee that there would be no defeat. So what's the deal?

Cult of tank numbers.

Why didn’t the Red Army, having 23,000 tanks, more than 20,000 aircraft, 60,000 guns, defeat the Germans when they had several times less of all this? Very often this is how the question is posed. The numbers may change depending on the calculation methods, but the essence of the issue remains exactly the same. And as a consequence of such a statement, answers are also sought. “Stalin is to blame for everything” has been heard since the time of Khrushchev. “The whole point is that they were preparing to attack, not defend,” claim Rezun’s followers. “Nobody wanted to fight for the bloody communist regime,” says Solonin. “The generals betrayed” - Yuri Mukhin assures. And for some reason, few people ask why only equipment is compared without taking into account where and in what condition it was. The question, by the way, is far from idle. If we ignore the number of tanks in the thousands and look at the dry lines of economic statistics, we can find out that the costs of producing these same tanks in the USSR were only a small part of the costs of weapons production. For example, consider 1937:

In other countries, for example, in Germany, they made up an even smaller part. So why did they spend so little on tanks, if it is enough to produce 20,000 tanks, and victory is guaranteed? The same can be said about aviation (the cost of aircraft is approximately equal to the cost of tanks) and artillery. The cost of producing weapons is not as high as it might seem. Much more were the costs for various types of auxiliary equipment. For example, one Comintern tractor cost 64,625 rubles in 1937, which is almost the same as the T-26 tank (71,710 rubles for a linear one and 75,810 rubles for a radio station installed). . At the same time, the number of tractors or cars reached approximately 1/10 of the cost of a tank (for comparison, a ZIS-5 car cost 10,000 rubles, an ambulance based on GAZ-AA - 13,863, and a water and oil tanker based on ZIS-6 - all 32,000 rubles, with this BT tank cost 101,250 rubles in the linear version and 104,580 in the radio version), while being more than 10 times larger in number than them. If you look at the situation with traction equipment in Germany, the advantage of the German army becomes clear. According to Halder, in 1941 the invading army alone had 500,000 vehicles, not counting half-tracks, crawler tractors and tractors. This number did not include Luftwaffe vehicles, navy vehicles, or vehicles of various paramilitary organizations used by the army, but not formally part of the army, for example, the National Socialist Automobile Corps.

Ammunition production took up even more resources. In general, the distribution of military orders in 1940 was carried out in the following way:

Distribution of orders from NPOs of the USSR among the people's commissariats of industry (thousand rubles in 1940 prices)

At the same time, the production of armored vehicles was distributed between the People's Commissariats of "civil" engineering. In particular, tank factories of the former People's Commissariat of Defense Industry No. 183, 174 and No. 37 were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Medium Engineering of the USSR formed on July 2, 1939.

Thus, it is quite naive to base an assessment of the combat effectiveness of armies on the number of tanks and aircraft. These values ​​simply do not take into account most of the resources spent on the army. It is quite natural that they are spent for a reason.

Feature Soviet system weapons on the eve of 1941 there was a clear superiority of tanks over other types of weapons. But having received many tanks, the Red Army also acquired problems in other areas. For example, in spare parts for the same tanks or tractors. In 1941 it was planned to produce " b) spare parts for T-34 tanks at plants No. 183 and STZ1 for the People's Commissariat of Defense in the amount of 18 million rubles, including 200 gearboxes, ensuring their delivery on time in agreement with GABTU KA2" But " T-34 tanks in the amount of 2,800 pieces, including 1,800 pieces from plant No. 183 and 1,000 pieces from STZ". The cost of the T-34 tank at plant No. 183 in 1941 was 242.2 thousand rubles. Thus, funds were allocated for spare parts equal to the cost of less than 80 tanks for an order of more than 4,000 tanks. Why this happened is a separate question and it is connected more with the peculiarities of the development of the domestic military-industrial complex than with the combat capability of the Red Army. But, one way or another, the amazing number of Red Army tanks was largely exaggerated. It must be said that the Soviet aircraft industry experienced approximately similar problems, but there was also an acute shortage of duralumin mixed in.

If we compare all expenditures on armaments, then, despite all the complexity of the comparisons, they can be assessed as approximately equal for Germany and the USSR. It must be taken into account that labor productivity in the USSR remained significantly lower than in Germany, despite significant successes in improving it.

Thus, the technical advantage of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht declared by revisionists and pop historians is a myth. It is formed by comparing individual, most impressive figures. Resources that were spent on production in the Red Army large number tanks, aircraft and guns were spent in other countries, for example, in Germany, on the production of ammunition, means of propulsion, spare parts, communications equipment and other no less, and often more difficult to produce, but no less necessary supplies.

The reasons for our defeats.

But if the Red Army did not have an overwhelming superiority in weapons, this does not mean at all that it should have been defeated so quickly. What is the reason?

If we turn to the first picture, we can notice one very important feature: if the Wehrmacht troops are deployed directly at the border, then the Soviet troops are stretched deep to the rear, tens of kilometers for units of the First Strategic Echelon, and 27A was generally located in Estonia, hundreds of kilometers away from the border. Naturally, they could do nothing to help the border troops in the first hours, and even days of fighting. Moreover, in fact, even for the troops indicated at the border, only “separate units and units for observation” were present there. Why did this happen? Why did Soviet troops find themselves scattered deep into the territory in 1941? To do this, we will have to consider the Soviet theory of the initial period of the war.

There is a well-known expression about the classics of Russian literature: “we all came out of Gogol’s “The Overcoat”.” In relation to military affairs, all or almost all or almost all military theories of the 20s-30s. in one form or another they generalized the experience gained in the First World War. The Soviet Union was also not offended by theorists. Such prominent scientists as Svechin, Verkhovsky, Triandafillov, Shilovsky, Tukhachevsky and many others worked actively. However, it was precisely the initial period of the war that was dealt with by a relatively small number of theorists. One can note the very original, although not controversial, works of Svechin on this topic; he spoke out on this topic and Tukhachevsky, at least in letters to Voroshilov, expressed his thoughts to Uborevich. But after the repressions, many prominent theorists were destroyed, and with them the authority of their works fell almost to zero. In this situation, practically the only major work touching on the issues of the initial period of the war and the pre-war period was the work of B.M. Shaposhnikov, “The Brain of the Army,” which was favored by official criticism even during its publication. (you can read about the assessment of this book by official criticism and the reaction of modern historians to it, for example, in a collection published in 2002 by the European University of St. Petersburg). The experience of the Imperialist War did not provide examples of a politically sudden invasion. All countries were able to mobilize more or less calmly, all countries exchanged notes and claims for quite a long time before entering the war. And the preparation of alliances for war took decades, and only a few countries (Italy, Bulgaria, Romania) decided on their preferences at the last moment. It is quite natural that Shaposhnikov assessed the experience gained from the previous war as follows:

« Preparations for war usually last for months,” continues Clausewitz, “so it happens very rarely that one state warns another by an accidental war or by the general direction of its forces.”

Thus, the philosopher of war, even for his time, reduced “political surprise” to almost nothing. Indeed, it can hardly be said that the world war caught any of the states politically suddenly. Everything we said above about European politics on the eve of 1914 says the opposite. Of course, we are not going to believe the tales of Poincaré, according to whose testimony Germany suddenly attacked France, and Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia.

At modern means Intelligence by one state of military training of another cannot speak of any political surprise. In this we fully agree with the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, who pointed out to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that it was impossible to hide preparations for war and, due to surprise or fear of attracting the attention of another state, there was no reason not to prepare for war.

Thus, we deny political surprise and do not want to set diplomacy the task of enabling us to take advantage of this means."

For some reason, it is believed that the events of World War II indicated the opposite. However, if we consider the course of the war between the great powers (Germany and Italy on the one hand, and France, England, plus the “friendly-neutral” USA on the other), we will see a completely familiar picture. France announced mobilization back in August 1939. England also managed to mobilize quite calmly, and even transfer an expeditionary force to France. In turn, Italy’s entry into the war did not take France by surprise, and even in the conditions of complete collapse on the front against Germany, French troops in the Alps managed to hold off the attackers. In the same way, Germany’s entry into the war against Greece on the side of Italy cannot be called sudden. The events surrounding the invasion of Norway and Denmark seem to be some exceptions. However, if you take a closer look, this invasion can hardly be called a “sudden attack.” The whole idea of ​​the invasion boiled down to occupying Norway before English troops appeared there. However, the last intention was already known. Moreover, the British fleet has already begun laying mines in Norwegian territorial waters. (for more details, see) Thus, the situation in the Scandinavian countries was also heating up and the Germans had an excellent reason for an invasion. It is no coincidence that German soldiers caught by the Norwegians from a transport sunk by an English submarine claimed that “ they were sent to Bergen to help the Norwegians defend against the British invasion»

The opinion has taken root that the causes of the defeats were anticipated by the famous Soviet theorist, divisional commander Isserson, in his work “New Forms of Struggle.” It is also often mentioned that his warning was rejected by Klenov at a meeting of the command staff in 1940. Let's look at what exactly Klenov criticized:

« I recently looked at Isserson’s book “New Forms of Struggle.” There are hasty conclusions, based on the German war with Poland, that there will be no initial period of war, that the war today is resolved simply - by the invasion of ready-made forces, as was done by the Germans in Poland, who deployed one and a half million people.

I think such a conclusion is premature. It can be allowed for a state like Poland, which, having become arrogant, lost all vigilance, and which did not have any intelligence about what was happening with the Germans during the period of many months of concentration of troops. Every self-respecting state, of course, will try to use this initial period in its own interests in order to find out what the enemy is doing, how he is grouping, what his intentions are, and to prevent him from doing this.

The question of the initial period of the war must be raised in order to organize a special kind of offensive operations. These will be operations of the initial period, when the enemy armies have not yet completed their concentration and are not ready for deployment. These are intrusion operations to solve a number of special tasks. And today these problems remain and must be resolved. This is the impact of large aviation and, perhaps, mechanized forces, until the enemy is prepared for decisive action, on his mobilization, concentration and deployment in order to disrupt them, carry the concentration deeper into the territory, and delay time. This type of operation will, of course, be of a special nature.

The issue of performing these special operations is very complex. It is quite natural that it is necessary to warn the enemy of the readiness of such means for carrying out operations as aviation and mechanized units in terms of their deployment and quantity. Organizing and conducting such operations will ensure air supremacy, will not allow [the enemy] to mobilize, and will complicate [its] deployment. And in connection with this same issue are related the operations of the initial period, which are conducted in the interests of capturing the frontiers in order to obtain an advantageous position for deployment.

To carry out such operations we will deal with cover units. But I do not exclude the situation that during this period, Comrade Pavlov, mechanized units will have to be used independently, even despite the presence of large engineering structures, and they will solve the problem of invading enemy territory.”

It is easy to see that Klenov is talking about a situation where the enemy’s intention to enter into conflict is known. In the case of the USSR, Germany did not show any dissatisfaction; Germany did not react to the TASS message of June 14, which, according to Vasilevsky, was a sounding of the position of the German government. So how should the country's leadership act in accordance with Soviet military theory? It considered it obvious that as long as there were no ultimatums, or at least any claims, it was too early to expect a war.

If the Soviet political leadership can be blamed for the army’s unpreparedness for war, it is only because it strictly followed the theories that the army adhered to. What did this lead to? Let us turn again to the disposition of troops before the start of the war:

It is easy to see the difference in the deployment of German and Soviet troops. German troops are concentrated near the border and have a density of about several kilometers per division, and in the main directions this density increases to 2-3 kilometers per division. Soviet troops are dispersed over many hundreds of kilometers inland. Their density is approximately the same everywhere and is approximately 30–40 km per division. It may seem that 3 divisions are concentrated near Brest, but their deployment is dictated only by housing conditions. But the cover areas for the rifle divisions were just as extensive. For comparison with PU-39 " On a normal front, an infantry division can successfully defend a strip 8-12 km wide along the front and 4-6 km deep; rifle regiment - a section along the front of 3-5 km and a depth of 2.5-3 km; battalion - an area along the front of 1.5-2 km and the same depth. In particularly important areas, defense fronts can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division. ". The 22nd TD was generally supposed to withdraw to the cover area. In general, there was simply no chance to hold the defense along the state border of the USSR. Defeat, and a quick defeat with the destruction of divisions as tactical formations, was inevitable. So what is next? As is easy to see from the map, after the defeat of the border divisions, the deep divisions could only replace, and not support, the defeated troops. The result was a classic blitzkrieg scheme - destroying an army piecemeal, each time having numerical superiority and superiority in initiative. The only thing that worked in favor of the Red Army in this situation was the gradual lag behind the infantry divisions from the mobile formations of the Wehrmacht and the SS. However, this factor did not begin to act immediately; in fact, the advanced troops lost operational contact with the infantry only by the time the mobile troops reached Minsk. The defeat of the troops in the Border Battle was inevitable.

Conclusion.

Thus, at the moment there is no evidence that would indicate orders from the NPO or the General Staff to bring the troops of the border districts to combat readiness. On the contrary, there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. And this situation was quite predictable, since, in accordance with Soviet military theory, the outbreak of war could not occur without foreign policy complications. In June 1941, Germany did not express absolutely any complaints against the USSR. Even if the German army is fully prepared for an invasion, as the same theory required, it must be preceded by a diplomatic justification for the war. Any ultimatum and response to it takes time. During this time, it is quite possible to bring the troops into combat readiness and, perhaps, even mobilize.

On the other hand, even putting troops on alert was not able to prevent a catastrophe. The Germans pre-empted the Soviet troops in deployment and would have defeated the Soviet troops even if this decision had been made. In order to fundamentally change the course of events, it was necessary to withdraw troops to the border, if possible, secretly, so that the enemy would not discover the preparations and would not be able to react accordingly. This is exactly what was done. Unfortunately, the enemy did not give us the opportunity to carry out our plans. But this is precisely where Pavlov or anyone else is not to blame.

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1. 1941: In 2 books. / Comp. L.E. Reshin et al.; Ed. V.P. Naumova; Entry Art. acad. A.N.Yakovleva. - M.: International Foundation "Democracy", 1998. - 832 p. - (“Russia. XX century. Documents” / Edited by Academician A.N. Yakovlev), document No. 603

2. Plekhov A.M. Dictionary of military terms. M: Military Publishing House, 1988, p. 27

3. 1941: In 2 books, document No. 630

4. Egorov D. The defeat of the Western Front, M: Yauza, 2008

5. “...Destroy Russia in the spring of 1941.” (A. Hitler, July 31, 1940): Documents from the intelligence services of the USSR and Germany. 1937–1945 / Comp. Yampolsky V.P. - M.; Kuchkovo field, 2008., p. 486

6. Krikunov V.P. The front-line soldiers responded like this! – M: Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense 1989, No. 5 p. 27 - (Military history magazine No. 5/1989)

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8. Isaev A.V. From Dubno to Rostov. - M.: AST; Transitbook, 2004. p. 123

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10. Zakharov M.V. General Staff in the pre-war years. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1989, pp. 274-276

11. Front-line illustration 5 - 2002. Kolomiets M.V. 1941: Fighting in the Baltic States. M: Strategy KM, 2002, p. 20

10. Collection of combat documents. Issue No. 34/ Comp. Sgibieva G.G. and others - M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1953, p. 48

11. Collection of combat documents. Issue No. 34/ Comp. Sgibieva G.G. and others - M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1953, p. 53

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15. Collection of combat documents. Issue No. 34/ Comp. Sgibieva G.G. and others - M.: Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, 1953, p. With. 57

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17. Front-line illustration 5 - 2002. Kolomiets M.V. 1941: Fighting in the Baltic States. M: Strategy KM, 2002, p. 58

18. Front-line illustration 5 - 2002. Kolomiets M.V. 1941: Fighting in the Baltic States. M: Strategy KM, 2002, p. 78

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31. Shaposhnikov B.M. The brain of the army. T. 3, M: State Publishing House. Department of Military Literature., 1929, p. 266

32. Isserson G.S. New forms of struggle. - M.: Voengiz, 1940.

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The past season at Zenit was Nikita Barinov’s first full season in Russia. Before that, I spent half a season in one club or another. And the 27-year-old forward also missed playing practice. True, Zenit decided not to provide it to Barinov anymore: the basketball player learned about his farewell to the club from the Internet. I had to choose again, this time between VTB and the Super League. Outweighed the opportunity to play. (Photo - BC Spartak website, BC Zenit website, BC Parma website, championat.com)

While Zenit is not doing very convincing work on the transfer market, fellow countrymen from Spartak are putting together a real “gang”. Nikita Barinov decided not to leave the banks of the Neva after he was expelled from Vasily Karasev’s team. In this situation, for the red and white, third place in the Super League becomes a minimum task. (Photo - official websites of Zenit, Spartak and Samara)

Zenit knows how to come back. The nightmare first half of yesterday's away match with Torino turned into a victorious march. Rimas Kurtinaitis and his “Lietuvos Rytas” did everything to help their Baltic neighbors. No longer having a real chance of reaching the playoffs, the Lithuanians beat Torino, which provided the blue-white-blue with an 11-point lead in the decisive game with the Italians. Had they lost to Ritas, the team of father and son Karasevs would have been satisfied only with victory. (Photo - Torino official website)

The blue-white-sky blues suffered their first defeat at the Top 16 stage. St. Petersburg's mainstay under the shields, Drew Gordon, is still out of the game due to a leg injury, but Vasily Karasev did not dare to meet Bayern's most powerful front line with a small five. Instead, they put a “joker” on the floor. The massive Russian deep reserve Nikita Barinov, known to the team as Tank, finally got playing time. (Photo - official website of the Eurocup)

Lines from the popular song of “Hot Shots” probably came to mind more than once for Zenit fans who “pushed” for another trip to their neighbors in the Baltic. The support of the blue-white-blues came in handy - fortune traditionally this season either winked or turned away from Karasev Sr.’s charges. (Photo – official website of the VTB United League)

There were versions that the vessels determined the onset of earthquakes, their fire-fighting function, and even the use of vessels against demonstrators.

The Sarov resident behaved quite aggressively, insisting on the version of earthquakes. Nikita was given the right to answer the question.

Let’s assume that there were ripples in the water even during a small earthquake,” Barinov said. - It could be seen. And, in this case, understand that there is danger and it’s time to save yourself. And pedestals for communication with the earth.

And the correct answer was unexpected. The presenter began to analyze the issue point by point together with the team. It turned out that the stone pedestals were hollow inside. And they are needed to prevent water from freezing during the cold season. A fire was lit under the vessels in freezing conditions, and the water was not covered with ice.

He asked experts to answer why huge bronze vessels for storing water were placed on stone pedestals.

By the way, the players were also defended by a Nizhny Novgorod resident, albeit a former one. The team’s lawyer was the general director of the state corporation Rosatom, Alexey Likhachev. Earlier we told how the Rosatom children's team played in the tournament.

The team also lost the question about the long soft toy. It turned out that such toys are placed under the door or on the windowsill so that there are no drafts in the room.

The next question was why the people of Rome called one of the bridges English. The experts decided to take the help of the audience. The club suggested that, like in England, left-hand traffic was introduced on the bridge. The answer turned out to be correct and the presenter scolded Konstantin Ruder for the fact that his team was missing the correct versions and absent-mindedness.

The team managed to answer the fourth question correctly.

Nikita Barinov again answered the question with black boxes. He got confused in definitions and boxes. But, nevertheless, he answered correctly.

The next question was again a failure. It was Barinov who insisted on the answer. The team lost the third point.

Nikita Barinov answered again. He answered incorrectly again and the team lost another point.

The team answered the last question only partially and the presenter gave it the sixth point at the big request of the defenders. With difficulty, but the team became a contender for victory in the spring series..

Konstantin Ruder's team appeared at the club five years ago. In the first season, she won three victories and reached the final of the year. In the second season, the team made it to the winter series of games. Then there were one win and one loss, two defeats and a disqualification for the season. The team consists of: Nikita Barinov, Alexandra Zolotova, Roman Kuzikov, Evgeniy Fionov, Ilya Bazhenov.

Nikita Barinov. TRAINING OF ROYAL ARMY OFFICERS (myths and reality)

If we objectively consider the position of the army at the time of the death of the Russian Empire, a sad picture easily emerges. There is a myth about the officers of the tsarist army. This will be somewhat surprising, but, in my opinion, it was created primarily by Soviet propaganda. In the heat of the class struggle, “gentlemen officers” were portrayed as rich, well-groomed and, as a rule, dangerous enemies, the antipodes of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in general and its command staff in particular. This was especially evident in the film “Chapaev”, where instead of Kolchak’s rather poorly dressed and trained troops, Chapaev was confronted by the “Kappelites” in clean black and white uniforms, advancing in a “psychic” attack in a beautiful formation. According to high income, training was also expected, as a consequence - high level training and skills. All this was picked up and developed by fans of “The Russia We Lost” and the White Cause. Despite the fact that among them there are, of course, talented historians and simply lovers of military history, the praise of the officers often reached the point of absurdity.

but in fact, the situation with the combat training of officers was initially sad. And not the least role in this was played by the rather difficult financial situation of the officers. Roughly speaking, the best students of the gymnasium simply did not want to “pull the burden” in the service of an officer, when much simpler and more profitable career prospects in the civilian field opened up before them. It is no coincidence that the future Marshal of the Soviet Union, and at the beginning of the 20th century, cadet Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov, wrote in his memoirs: “Of course, it was difficult for my then comrades to understand my decision to go to military school. The fact is that I graduated from a real school, as noted above, with an average score of 4.3. With this score they usually entered higher technical educational institutions. In general, young people with weak theoretical training went to military schools. At the threshold of the 20th century, such an opinion about the command staff of the army was quite common. "Boris Mikhailovich himself joined the army because"My parents lived very frugally, because my younger sister Yulia also started studying in Chelyabinsk at a girls’ gymnasium. I had to think more than once about the questions: how can I make life easier for my family? More than once the thought came to mind: “Should I go to military service? Secondary education would allow one to enter directly into a military school. I couldn’t even dream of studying at a higher technical institution for five years at my parents’ expense. Therefore, I have already, privately, firmly decided to go along the military line. »

Contrary to the cliche about officers as noble landowners, in fact, officers at the end of the Romanov era, although they came, as a rule, from the nobility, were close to commoners in their financial situation.

« The presence of land ownership even among the generals and, oddly enough, the guards was far from a frequent occurrence. Let's look at the numbers. Of the 37 corps commanders (36 army and one guards), data regarding land ownership is available on 36. Of these, five had it. The largest landowner was the commander of the Guards Corps, General. V.M. Bezobrazov, who owned an estate of 6 thousand dessiatines and gold mines in Siberia. Of the remaining four, one had no indication of the size of his estate, and each of the three had about one thousand dessiatines. Thus, in the highest command category, with the rank of general, only 13.9% had land ownership.
Of the 70 heads of infantry divisions (67 army and 3 guards), as well as 17 cavalry divisions (15 army and two guards), i.e. 87 people, 6 people have no information about property. Of the remaining 81, only five have it (two guards generals, who were large landowners, and three army generals, two of whom had estates, and one had his own house). Consequently, 4 people, or 4.9%, had land ownership.

Let's turn to the regiment commanders. As mentioned above, we analyze all the grenadier and rifle regiments, and half of the infantry regiments that were part of the divisions. This amounted to 164 infantry regiments, or 61.1% of the total. In addition, 48 cavalry (hussars, lancers and dragoons) regiments, which were part of 16 cavalry divisions, are considered.” If we compare these figures with similar ones for civil officials of the same classes, we get the following: “Let us turn to the list of civil ranks of the first three classes. In 1914, there were 98 second-class officials, of which 44 owned land property, which was 44.9%; third class - 697 people, of which 215 people owned property, accounting for 30.8%.

Let us compare data on the availability of land ownership among military and civilian officials of the corresponding classes. So, we have: second class ranks - military - 13.9%, civilians - 44.8%; third class - military - 4.9%, civilians - 30.8%. The difference is colossal. »

About the financial situation P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: “So, the officer corps, which included up to 80% of the nobles, consisted of the serving nobility and in terms of financial status was no different from the commoners "Quoting Protopresbyter Shavelsky, the same author writes: "The officer was an outcast from the royal treasury. It is impossible to indicate a class in Tsarist Russia that was worse off than the officers. The officer received a meager salary that did not cover all his urgent expenses /.../. Especially if he had a family, eked out a miserable existence, was malnourished, entangled in debt, denying himself the most necessary things. »

As we have already seen, the land holdings of even the highest command staff were in no way comparable to those of civil officials. This was partly a consequence of the fact that the salaries of officials were significantly higher than that of generals: “As mentioned above, the annual salary of the division chief was 6,000 rubles, and the governor’s salary was from 9,600 thousand to 12.6 thousand rubles per year, i.e. almost twice as much. " On " wide leg“Only the guardsmen lived. General Ignatiev colorfully, although perhaps somewhat tendentiously, describes his service in perhaps the most elite regiment of the army Russian Empire- Life Guards Cavalry Regiment. He notes the enormous “cost” of serving in this regiment, which was associated with the cost of uniforms, two particularly expensive horses, etc. However, P.A. Zayonchkovsky believes that even this was not the most “expensive” regiment. He considers this to be the Life Guards Hussar Regiment, during service in which he had to spend 500 rubles a month - the salary of the division chief! In general, the Guard was a completely separate corporation, the existence of which brought great confusion to the career growth of officers.

On the one hand, the guard was staffed by the best graduates of schools. To do this, you had to get a “guards score” (more than 10 out of 12). Moreover, thanks to the system in which graduates chose their vacancies in order of average scores, the best cadets entered the guard. On the other hand, vacancies in the guard were available only in elite educational institutions. For example, it was almost impossible for a non-nobleman to get into the most elite Corps of Pages. Already fourth on the semi-official list of the most prestigious schools, Aleksandrovskoe always had a minimum of guards vacancies, and therefore Tukhachevsky was very lucky in that he was able to graduate as the best among the cadets. Thus, the already closed nature of the schools, which had a significant number of vacancies, greatly limited the entry of unborn cadets there. However, this was not the last obstacle to getting into the guard. According to an unspoken law, but firmly followed and noted by many researchers: joining the regiment must be approved by the officers of the regiment. This closeness and casteism could block the path up the career ladder for any “freethinker,” since loyal feelings were mandatory for service in the guard. Finally, we have already talked about the “property qualification”. Thus, first of all, rich, well-born officers ended up in the guard. True, they had to complete the school course with excellence, but most equally, if not more talented officers did not even have the opportunity to join the guards regiment. But the guard was the “forge of personnel” for the generals of the tsarist army! Moreover, promotion in the guard was, in principle, faster and easier. Not only did the guardsmen have a 2-rank advantage over army officers, but there was also no rank of lieutenant colonel, which further accelerated growth. We are no longer talking about connections and prestige! As a result, most of the generals came from the Guard; moreover, most of the generals who did not have an education at the General Staff Academy came from there. Eg "in 1914, the army had 36 army corps and 1 guard corps. ... Let us turn to the data on education. Of the 37 corps commanders, 34 had higher military education. Of these, 29 people graduated from the General Staff Academy, 2 from the Artillery Academy, and 1 from the Engineering and Legal Academy. Thus, 90% had higher education. To the three who did not have higher education, belonged to the commander of the Guards Corps, Gen. V.M. Bezobrazov, 12th army corps gene. A.A. Brusilov and the 2nd Caucasian Corps, General. G.E. Berkhman. Of the listed corps commanders, 25 people in the past, and one (General Bezobrazov) currently served in the guard. »

It is difficult to agree with the author that this was explained solely by the “ability” of the guards. After all, it was they who first of all got to the highest positions, without having an education from the Academy of the General Staff, which the author himself admits: “According to the “Schedule” of 1914, the Russian army consisted of 70 infantry divisions: 3 guards, 4 grenadiers, 52 infantry and 11 Siberian rifle divisions. Their commanders were lieutenant generals... By education: 51 people had higher military education (of which 46 graduated from the General Staff Academy, 41 graduated from the Military Engineering Academy, 1 from the Artillery Academy). Thus, 63.2% had higher education. Of the 70 commanders of infantry divisions, 38 were guardsmen (past or present). It is interesting to note that of the 19 people who did not have a higher military education, 15 were guards officers. The guards' advantage was already showing here. “As you can see, the “guards advantage” affects the level of division commanders. Where does it go when the same people are appointed for a little more high post the head of the corps? Moreover, for some unknown reason, the author was mistaken about G.E. Berkhman’s lack of higher education, and the rest of the generals were precisely from the guard. Bezobrazov, who did not have a higher education, but was very rich, generally commanded the Guards Corps. Thus, the Guard was a “supplier” of academically uneducated officers to the highest echelons of the army.

We can talk about such a serious problem as the lack of fairness in the distribution of ranks and positions: richer and more well-born officers, once in the guard, had a much better chance of making a career than those who pulled the burden and were sometimes more prepared (if only because of less ceremonial conditions of service) army colleagues. This could not but affect the quality of training of senior command staff or the psychological climate. It is known that division into “castes” reigned in the army. As already mentioned, guardsmen were allocated to a special group, having significant preferences among all officers. But it cannot be said that there were no frictions and differences within the guard and the rest of the army. Thus, the most educated officers traditionally served in the engineering troops and artillery. This was even reflected in jokes: “a handsome man serves in the cavalry, a smart man serves in the artillery, a drunkard serves in the navy, and a fool serves in the infantry.” The least prestigious was, of course, the infantry. And the “aristocratic” cavalry was considered the most prestigious. However, she also shared. So the hussars and lancers looked down on the dragoons. The 1st Heavy Brigade of the Guards Cavalry stood apart: the “courtiers” of the Cavalry Guards and the Life Guards Horse Regiment, “fought” for the title of the most elite regiment. In the foot guards, the so-called "Petrovskaya Brigade" - Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But, as Minakov notes, even here there was no equality: Preobrazhensky was more well-born. In the artillery, the cavalry was considered the elite, but the serfs were traditionally considered “outcasts,” which came back to haunt them in 1915 during the defense of fortresses. Of course, it cannot be said that such differences do not exist in other armies, but there was nothing good in separating and isolating different types of troops from each other.

Almost the only opportunity to accelerate career growth for talented army officers was admission to the Nikolaev Academy of the General Staff. The selection there was very careful. To do this, it was necessary to pass preliminary exams, and then entrance exams. At the same time, the best officers of the regiments initially surrendered them. According to Shaposhnikov, in the year of his admission, 82.6% of those who passed the preliminary exams passed the competition. However, despite such a careful selection of applicants, applicants had serious problems with general education subjects. "1) Very poor literacy, gross spelling errors. 2) Poor overall development. Bad style. Lack of clarity of thinking and general lack of mental discipline. 3) Extremely poor knowledge of history and geography. Insufficient literary education “However, one cannot say that this applied to all General Staff officers. Using the example of B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is easy to see that many of them did not have even a shadow of the problems mentioned above in the document. However, it should be noted that subsequent problems with education in the Red Army were radically different from similar ones in the tsarist army. The image of a well-educated tsarist officer is fairly idealized.

Training at the General Staff Academy lasted two years. In the first year, both military and general education subjects were covered, while military officers mastered disciplines related to the combat operations of units. In the second year, general education subjects were completed, and disciplines related to strategy were studied from the military. In addition, every day there were horse riding lessons in the arena. As Shaposhnikov notes, this was a consequence of the experience of Russian- Japanese war, when the division during the battles near the Yantai Mines, Orlov's division scattered, ending up in a high kaoliang, when the chief of staff's horse bolted and he could not stop it, leaving the division completely beheaded, since the division commander was wounded. Perhaps this was already unnecessary for the positional massacre of the First World War, but in response to the critical remark of Boris Mikhailovich himself about the archaic nature of the horse as a method of transportation compared to the automobile introduced in Europe, we note that Russian industry simply did not have the ability to supply the army with a sufficient amount of transport. Buying it abroad was expensive and quite reckless from the point of view of independence from foreign supplies.

The training itself also had significant shortcomings. For example, many authors note little attention to the development of initiative and practical skills in general. Classes consisted almost exclusively of lectures. The end result, instead of highly qualified staff workers, was theoreticians who did not always have an idea of ​​how to act in a real situation. According to Ignatiev, only one teacher even focused on the will to win.

Another problem was the enormous amount of time spent on some completely outdated items, such as drawing the terrain in line drawings. In general, this art was such a memorable subject that many memoirists write unkind words about it. ,
Contrary to the well-known myth about the generals’ passion for the French school of Grandmaison, “élan vitale”6, Shaposhnikov testifies to his sympathy for German theories. True, he notes that the top generals were not familiar with German methods of war.

In general, the strengths of the career officers of the tsarist army were their fighting spirit and readiness for self-sacrifice. And there could be no talk of carelessness like conversations about absolutely secret things in a cafe, which Shaposhnikov describes in “The Brain of the Army” in relation to the Austrian army. The concept of an officer’s honor was worth a lot to career military personnel. Young officers of the General Staff, after the reforms carried out by Golovin, received a generally good education, despite many shortcomings. What was especially important was that the tactics of the German troops were no longer a revelation to them, as they were to more senior commanders. The problem of the latter was a weak interest in self-development, in innovations both in technology and in the art of war. As A.M. Zayonchkovsky notes, the disastrous situation with the training of senior command personnel was partly a consequence of the General Staff’s inattention to the problem: “AboutPaying great attention to the training of troops and the improvement of junior command personnel, the Russian General Staff completely ignored the selection and training of senior command personnel: the appointment of persons who spent their entire lives after graduating from the academy in an administrative position immediately to the position of division chief and corps commander was not uncommon. “Before the Russo-Japanese War, this situation was especially clear. There were jokes: “in 1905-1906 Commander of the Amur Military District, Gen. N.P. Linevich, seeing the howitzer, asked in surprise: what kind of weapon is this? "The same author notes: "The same Lenevich (correctly Linevich - N.B.) did not know how to read maps properly and did not understand what it was like for trains to move on schedule. “And among the commanders of regiments and brigades,” Shavelsky further notes, “sometimes there were complete ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science was not loved by our military " Denikin echoes them:

"I The Japanese war, among other revelations, led us to the realization that command personnel need to learn. Forgetting this rule was one of the reasons for the dependence of many commanders on their headquarters. Before the war, the commander, starting from the position of regiment commander, could remain calm with the “scientific” baggage that he once carried out from the military or cadet school; may not have followed the progress of military science at all, and it never occurred to anyone to take an interest in his knowledge. Any inspection would be considered insulting... The general condition of the unit and partly only its control during maneuvers provided a criterion for the commander’s assessment. The latter, however, is very relative: given the inevitable conventionality of maneuvering actions and our general complacency during maneuvers, it was possible to make as many gross mistakes as we wanted and with impunity; the disapproving review in the description of large maneuvers, which reached the units after a few months, lost its sharpness. »
In addition, the officer corps at the highest echelons was extremely old. By age of corps commandersdistributed as follows: from 51 to 55 years old - 9 people, from 56 to 60 - 20, and from 61 to 65 - 7. Thus, over 75% of corps commanders were over 55 years old. Average age their age was 57.7 years. The division commanders were only slightly younger. From 51 to 55 years old - 17, from 56 to 60 - 48 and from 61 to 65 - 5. Thus, the bulk of the commanders of infantry divisions were over 55 years old. Their average age was 57.0 years. True, the commanders of cavalry divisions were on average 5.4 years younger. And this is after the “purge” carried out by the energetic Minister of War Roediger, who, however, quickly lost his portfolio and was replaced by the less firm Sukhomlinov. During his rather short reign, the certification commission that worked under his leadership was appointed: commanders of district troops - 6; their assistants - 7; commanders buildings - 34; commandants of fortresses - 23; chiefs of infantry divisions - 61; chiefs of cavalry divisions - 18; heads of individual brigades (infantry and cavalry) - 87; commanders of non-separate brigades - 140; commanders of infantry regiments - 255; commanders of individual battalions - 108; commanders of cavalry regiments - 45. He also petitioned for the dismissal of the most mediocre commanders from the army. But Nicholas II became the problem. Now praised with all his might, the monarch cared little about the combat effectiveness of the army, paying much more attention to its uniform and loyalty to the throne. The tsar in every possible way prevented the removal of generals he liked and the financing of the army to the detriment of the fleet. The appointment of Yanushkevich, who was completely inappropriate for the position of Chief of the General Staff, for example, became possible only thanks to the patronage of the Sovereign. No less blame lies with the prime minister, since the distribution of budget funds largely depended on him. That is why he protected from dismissal the generals who showed talent in pacifying the rebels, and not on the battlefield. Quoting Polivanov’s diary P.A. Zayonchkovsky writes: ““Received from E.V. journal of the Higher Attestation Commission regarding corps commanders; permission followed for the dismissal of the gene. Shutleworth; against the conclusion on the dismissal of the general. Krause and Novosiltseva - the highest resolution is to “leave”, but against the gene. Adlerberg: “I know him, he is not a genius, but an honest soldier: in 1905 he defended Kronstadt” " What blood it cost to appoint Rennenkampf, who had not distinguished himself in any way on the battlefields of Manchuria, but was the “hero” of the suppression of the 1905 revolution, as commander of the army invading East Prussia is well known.

True, it cannot be said that they did not try to rectify the situation. As the same Denikin writes “Tone way or another, after the Japanese war, senior command staff were also forced to study. In the spring of 1906, the order of the Minister of War first appeared by order of the highest order: “Troop commanders should establish appropriate training for senior command personnel, starting with unit commanders up to and including corps commanders, aimed at developing military knowledge.” This innovation caused irritation at the top: the old people grumbled, seeing in it a desecration of gray hairs and an undermining of authority... But things progressed little by little, although at first there were some frictions and even oddities. "It was possible to partially instill an interest in self-development in artillery: "Never before has military thought probably worked so intensively as in the years following the Japanese War. They talked, wrote, and shouted about the need to reorganize the army. The need for self-education increased, and, accordingly, interest in military literature increased significantly, causing the emergence of a number of new bodies. It seems to me that if it were not for the lesson of the Japanese campaign and the subsequent recovery and feverish work, our army would not have withstood even several months of the test of a world war... “However, the white general immediately admits that the work was proceeding at a very slow pace.

However, it cannot be said that these measures did not affect the combat effectiveness of the army. A.A. Svechin writes: “Ne less progress should be noted both in relation to tactical training of troops and in improving the qualifications of middle and lower command personnel ».

But this was not enough. It’s hard to disagree with A.M. Zayonchkovsky, who gave a very short, but also very succinct description of the Russian army before the First World War: “In general, the Russian army went to war with good regiments, with mediocre divisions and corps, and with bad armies and fronts, understanding this assessment in the broad sense of training, but not personal qualities. »

Nikita Barinov is a handsome and intellectually developed young man. Many of you may have seen him on the program “What? Where? When". Do you want to know what kind of education Nikita received? How is the personal life of the young expert? We will be happy to tell you everything.

Biography: childhood, youth and student life

Nikita Barinov was born on October 24, 1987 in the village of Vodovatovo, not far from Pavlovsky Posad (Moscow region). He was raised in an ordinary family.

Our hero studied well at school. His favorite subjects were physics and chemistry. But the boy considered music and drawing classes boring and useless.

Having received secondary education, Nikita Barinov submitted documents to MSTU. Bauman. His choice fell on the Faculty of Special Mechanical Engineering. A talented and confident guy, he passed the exams without difficulty. As a result, Nikita was enrolled in the required faculty.

Work and increases

In 2010, Barinov graduated from the university. He was awarded the long-awaited diploma. The guy had no problems finding a job. He received a position as a research engineer at the Russian Federal Nuclear Center (VNIIEF), located in the city of Sarov.

Despite being very busy, Nikita always finds time for her hobbies. The guy likes to play chess, studies military history and goes in for skiing. That's not all. He is a runner and turnstile man.

In 2010, the club was just emerging in Sarov mind games, sports version of “What? Where? When?". One of its first participants was Nikita Barinov. Together with the Pobeda team, he traveled to major tournaments and competitions. Our hero took part in 60 such events.

Participation in the legendary program

To the television club “What? Where? When” Barinov joined the team of the state corporation “Rosatom”. He and five of his colleagues working in the same field were invited to the set of the program. He was appointed captain of the team. He is an educated and respected man.

The program with the participation of the Rosatom team was aired on May 25, 2013. Nikita showed himself to be an extraordinary and confident player. He took three questions and answered them correctly. This brought victory to the team. Since then, Barinov has regularly participated in the intellectual show “What? Where? When?". He twice became the owner of the Crystal Atom. The young expert won the hearts of many television viewers, especially the female part of the audience.

Nikita Barinov (“What? Where? When?”): personal life

Our hero is an attractive guy with great career prospects. About this young man many Russian girls dream of. Moreover, he is not married.

Nikita himself admits that he has practically no free time left. Barinov works at a research institute and participates in various tournaments and marathons. Our hero has one character trait that prevents him from approaching a girl on the street and getting to know her. This is natural modesty.

Finally

Now you know where Nikita Barinov was born and studied. "What where When?" - a program that made him famous throughout the country. Let's wish such a wonderful guy intellectual victories and great love!